

Our Shared Animality

In *Mind and World*, McDowell attempts to dissolve the confusions involved in a conception of nature which writes us out of it. To do so, he rehabilitates an ancient idea: that our animality, our way of being natural, is intrinsically connected to our rationality. McDowell hopes thereby to render unmysterious our powers of reasoning, while preserving the distinctive character of rationality in relation to the kind of nature studied by natural scientists.

As part of this project he takes up what he takes to be the Kantian claim that the deliverances of sensibility in us are, as such, permeated by spontaneity. The world is available for us to think about, and we can only make sense of that fact (he claims) with a conception of sensibility on which it is intrinsically tied to rationality. This differentiates our kind of sensibility from the sensibility of mere animals. But if the difference goes so deep then how can we make sense of it as the same kind of thing mere animals have? How can we recognize our shared animality?

McDowell thinks this objection rests on a shared-factor conception of what nature and rational nature have in common. The difficulty of making sense of rational animality as a kind of animality disappears, he thinks, once one stops assuming that it means there is a shared factor. I argue that this response is insufficient. The genus no doubt expresses our shared animality, but it cannot be the *source* of our recognition of what is shared. For our recognition of what is shared must engage our capacity to recognize the rationality of rational animality, since our animality is intrinsically tied to rationality. So the genus can only express what is shared by resting on a concept which engages the capacity to recognize rationality.

This suggests that the recognition of what is shared is grounded in our grasp of rational animality, such that we grasp the genus through grasping this species of it. We know what it is for mere animals to sense because it is like what we do, only without being permeated by spontaneity. To make this out requires assimilating – to whatever extent we can – mere animality to rational animality. But that undermines the sharp distinction in intelligibility McDowell draws between the space of natural science, in which mere animals roam, and the space of reason, in which we move about.

The solution to the difficulty, I argue, is that we grasp what is shared through grasping the species mere animal, but in such a way that it cannot stand alone: in such a way that we must progress to grasp the species rational animal to so much as make sense of the animality of mere animals. This means that it must be internal to our conception of mere animals that we *necessarily* progress to a conception of rational animals. This goes beyond anything McDowell says, but it is the best way for him to make sense of our shared animality.

Section 1

The world is available for us to think about. That requires that the world affect us in some way. For that affection to be of the right sort to make the world available in thought, McDowell argues that the capacities operative in thinking – conceptual capacities – need to also be operative in being affected. His name for this joint operation is experience. In experience, the same capacities that are employed in the active exercise of judgment are passively drawn into operation in the world's affecting us.

McDowell argues for this position by noting that experience needs to exercise an intelligible constraint on judgment: if the activity of judging were not in some way conditioned

by our capacity to be affected by the world, then the very idea that our judgments can be about the world at all would be threatened.¹ Moreover, the constraint needs to be such that it can make it rational to make judgments about the world: even if we do not always judge in a way that is justified by experience, experience must be such that it can justify (that is, make rational) our judgments.²

Further, the subject needs to be able to take experience as something that can ground her judgments: otherwise she could not take it to be rational to judge anything at all on its basis. Hence, experience, what constrains her judgment, needs to justify her judgments and that justification needs to be available to her for her to think about. So, experience simply as such – as what constrains her thinking about the world – needs to be available to the subject’s thinking. But for experience simply as such to be available to her thinking is just for the capacities of thinking to already be operative in experience.

McDowell sometimes expresses his point about experience exercising a rational constraint on our judgment in a Kantian idiom by saying that experience is constituted by the joint cooperation of receptivity and spontaneity (cf. *MW*, 9, 51): receptivity is the capacity for the subject to be affected by the world, spontaneity is the capacity for the subject to think about the world, and their joint cooperation in experience is necessary to make sense of either. The motivation for making this claim about experience would be frustrated if we thought we could factor it into an independently intelligible contribution of sensibility and then another

¹ Cf. John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 5. Future citations of the work will occur in the body of the text: e.g. (*MW*, 5).

² If it could not justify our judgments, then the best kind of explanation we can give is one on which we understand why we judge without that reason supplying *us* with a reason to so judge: the best we can have is an “exculpation” and not a “justification” (*MW*, 8). And, if that was the best we could do, then we could not in fact make sense of the world’s availability for us to think about.

contribution of understanding.³ On this conception, experience is still supposed to be what justifies a subject's judgments. But for her to take experience to be a reason requires that its status as a reason be in principle available to her thinking – and that is not so on this factorized conception. Consequently, one cannot factor it out of her thinking by making it the sort of thing one could possess whether or not one had rational capacities.

It is for this reason that McDowell claims that “we must not suppose that receptivity makes an even notionally separable contribution to its co-operation with spontaneity” (*MW*, 51). He does not mean that we cannot draw a conceptual distinction between receptivity and spontaneity: such a distinction is entailed by his thought that what we have is a *cooperation*, which implies two distinguishable contributors. What he means, rather, is that one cannot grasp receptivity without grasping its unity with spontaneity. To put this in a nice slogan (taken from Andrea Kern): receptivity is constitutively united with spontaneity.⁴

Two important claims need to be added to this summary. First, there is the idea of one concept being *sui generis* with respect to another. In the case at hand, this means that one cannot explain something's standing in “the space of reasons” using the concepts of natural science: as McDowell puts it, “We must sharply distinguish natural-scientific intelligibility from the kind of intelligibility something acquires when we situate it in the logical space of reasons” (*MW*, xix). That is, we cannot understand one thing's standing in a rational relation (of justification, say) to another through appeal to natural science; rather, grasping this relation must already engage one's understanding of “the space of reasons,” in a way which cannot be spelled out in the terms employed by natural science.

³ McDowell attributes this conception of experience to Gareth Evans in the third lecture.

⁴ cf. Andrea Kern, *Quellen des Wissens* (Suhrkamp Verlag: Frankfurt am Main, 2006), 201-2.

What underwrites the claim to irreducibility is the conception that different laws govern the two spaces, that there are two sharply distinguished ways in which we make things intelligible. We situate something in one space or the other in what we say about it – for instance, I situate something in the space of reasons when I describe a belief as being justified, or prove that a hypothesis is improbable; and I situate something in the space of natural science when I describe a rock as being composed of calcium, or show that a heat-spike was caused by eruptions on the sun. One concept is *sui generis* with respect to some other concept just in case it belongs to making things intelligible in a different way from that other concept.

The second point to add concerns the possibility of mere animals. Mere animals have a form of receptivity that is different in kind from the receptivity of rational animals. But it is nevertheless very important to McDowell that both mere and rational animals perceive, that both feel pain – in short, that both are genuinely *animals*. For instance, he notes that it would be “outrageous to deny” that mere animals feel pain or perceive, and grants that this can seem to be a “discomfort” for those persuaded by his account (*MW*, 50). Thus, he acknowledges that he had better be able to make out a way in which both we and mere animals share our animality.

The main focus of the rest of this essay will be on what is required to win a conception of animality which is shared between us and mere animals while respecting the fact that what we have is *sui generis* with respect to what they have. For now I want merely to note that it is internal to McDowell’s project that we be able to respect, for instance, “the plain fact that we share perception with mere animals” (*MW*, 114). If acknowledging this plain fact turns out to require an account of what we share, of animality as such, which goes beyond what McDowell himself claims, it will nevertheless be licensed by his own conception of what is required to dissolve the confusion about rationality that he addresses in *Mind and World*.

Section 2

So, McDowell needs to make room for the plain fact that we and mere animals are both animals. And McDowell acknowledges that it might not be clear at first sight how he can do that – for one cannot grasp our animality without grasping its unity with the operations of rationality. Mere animality is different: whatever constitutes mere animality is intelligible without placing it and mere animals in the space of reasons. Hence, there must be a sharp distinction between the animality of mere and rational animals. But how can we recognize this distinction without undermining our ability to recognize what they genuinely have in common?⁵

What does McDowell say to this threat? First, he notes that we do not need to accept a shared-factor view, in which we have what mere animals have plus some additional capacities the presence of which do not transform whatever capacities we share with mere animals. Then he clarifies that really the case is just a case of a genus with two different species: “What we share with dumb animals is perceptual sensitivity to features of the environment. We can say that there are two species of that, one permeated by spontaneity and another independent of it. This

⁵ One important clarification: McDowell’s position does not commit him to denying that mere animals have beliefs or even knowledge. One can use whatever language one likes in describing mere animal behavior, so long as one keeps clear that our knowledge (for instance) is such that our reasons for judging as we do are available to us, while the reasons that mere animals have for knowing what they know are not (cf. McDowell, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” in *Having the World in View* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2009), 256-274, 256-7; cp. Matthew Boyle’s helpful discussion of the “Univocity Assumption” in his paper “Essentially Rational Animals,” in *Rethinking Epistemology*, Vol. 2 ed. Günter Abel and James Conant (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), 395-428, section 3.2). The traditional language for marking this distinction, which I will continue to use in this essay, is that we are rational or have reason and mere animals do not. But if one wants to think of what a cat does as reasoning – when it decides to go to the right because it saw the mouse go that way – that is fine; what matters is that the cat cannot become reflectively aware of what it is doing, such that it can recognize that it is going to the right because the mouse did. This is what places us into different logical spaces for McDowell; this is the difference that requires that our capacity to think already be operative in our receptivity.

From the other side, the mere fact that we can say of the cat that it judges, believes, knows, etc. is not an answer to the challenge of equivocation. For what it does is, on McDowell’s view, essentially different from what we do, and we must draw a sharp distinction between its judging and our judging, or its believing and our believing. This sharp distinction is what threatens McDowell’s view, and we should not allow our willingness to talk of judgment in the case of both to cover over it.

accommodates the combination of likeness and difference between us and dumb animals” (MW, 69). This claim exhausts what McDowell has to say about the logical character of our shared animality. But I think this answer does not suffice, that we need to explore further the character of this genus/species relation.

To see this, note first that rejecting the factorized view entails that the genus is not the source of our recognition of what we share with mere animals. The genus animal no doubt *expresses* our grasp of what is shared. But that does not mean that it is the *source* of our recognition of what is shared. To see that it cannot be, note that we cannot grasp the genus animal such that it is genuinely generic without adverting to rational animality. This is directly entailed by the constitutive unity point: we can certainly abstract from our grasp of experience to an aspect of it, receptivity. But our capacity to employ that concept cannot be the source of our capacity to recognize receptivity as it operates in our case – that source has to be our grasp of the unity of receptivity and spontaneity. In parallel fashion, our recognition of what is shared, as expressed in the genus, must rest on or flow through or engage our grasp of the rational animal species. But that means that the genus cannot be the source of our recognition of what is shared, for a genus contains only what is common to its species.

We seek an account on which we can make sense of the fact that something is common to both species. How are we able to recognize that something? So far, we have seen that it cannot be the genus itself. Given this, the natural next suggestion is to turn to the species as somehow enabling us to recognize what is common. I want first to focus on the thought that the source for our recognition of what is common lies in the rational animal species.

That we should first focus on the rational animal species is suggested by McDowell’s parallel treatment of mere animals and error. Both the possibility of mere animals and the

possibility of error have been taken to be objections to McDowell's view, and McDowell understands both objections to rest on a factorizing conception. But McDowell thinks that our grasp of error is derivative upon our grasp on another species, and the parallel suggests a similar claim in the case of mere animals: our grasp of mere animals rests on our grasp of rational animals. Hence, it seems reasonable to focus first on rational animality as a potential source for our recognition of the genus.

Consider the case of error from the side of judgment: here, the genus is belief, and the two species are knowledge and mere belief, or a belief which falls short of being knowledge. In this case, McDowell's position is clear: our grasp of mere belief rests on our grasp of knowledge. For, as noted in section 1, we can only make sense of an activity of judging on the basis of experience if the judger can grasp that activity as able to issue forth in knowledge. But this means that the idea of a successful exercise of the capacity to judge, one which issues forth in knowledge, is logically prior to the idea of an unsuccessful instance, one which issues forth in mere belief.⁶

In the case of mere beliefs, we have instances of a more general genus/species structure. We can articulate the structure using an Aristotelian idiom: in both cases, there is a perfect species – knowledge – and an imperfect species – mere belief. And the idea is that we understand the imperfect species through the perfect species: the perfect species is what the imperfect species should be, but (for whatever reason) is failing to be.⁷

⁶ This is a point that Kern has brought out with great force in *Quellen des Wissens*. McDowell more typically focuses on error from the side of experience, and not from the side of judgment. In this case, we can think about the two things as veridical perception and non-veridical perception (cf. *MW*, 113). And it is clear that McDowell thinks veridical perception is prior and that which enables us to get a grip on the idea of non-veridical perception, or perception which merely seems to put us in contact with the world.

⁷ The Aristotelian version can be found in the famous function argument of Nichomean Ethics 1.7: cf. Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 1097b23-1098a22. In a recent article, Anton Ford has called helpfully elucidated this kind of relation under the title “the essential

I've introduced the case of error to suggest an analogy with the case of mere animals. The analogy suggests that we understand one species as perfect and one as imperfect. That is perhaps a plausible fit for the case of error – but it is not the right shape for an account of mere animals. For it would commit us to another obvious absurdity: that mere animals are defective rational animals.⁸

We can avoid this absurdity and still follow through on the initial analogy in a somewhat relaxed fashion: we understand mere animality through understanding our own animality, where we take our animality to serve as a *paradigm* for animality as such. The logical core of this claim is that we understand the genus animality through appeal to rational animality, and that it is on this basis that we can understand mere animals.

This logical core is present in the case of the perfect/imperfect species, but it is more general: it is also present, for instance, in the Aristotelian idea of a “focal meaning.”⁹ And it is present too in a form that seems applicable to the present case: we abstract from one case and form analogies with other cases. This is suggested by the constitutive unity idea: we can abstract from experience to arrive at the concept of receptivity, while still preserving the idea that our grasp on receptivity depends upon our grasp of its unity with spontaneity. Having forged the generic concept – of being affected by the world, say – we can then consider whether that might be present, in an analogous way, without being pervaded by spontaneity. And it seems like we

genus/species relation”: cf. “Action and Generality” in *Essays on Anscombe's Intention*, ed. Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, Frederick Stoutland (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 76-104, and in particular 90-94.

⁸ To think that mere animals are defective animas sounds off because it holds them to a standard which is not internal to their nature. For we are saying that mere animals are defective rational animals – but mere animals are not, and are not trying to be, rational animals. Their capacities are not ours, and so it does not make sense to hold them to the standards set by our capacities. This contrasts nicely with the case of error, in which the very same capacity that issues forth in the defective cases also issues forth in the perfect cases. It is this fact which allows the notion of imperfection to get a grip. But there seems to be no parallel fact in the case of mere animals: no capacity which they exercise imperfectly by not being rational.

⁹ cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XI.3 1061b17ff.

can do something similar for animality. (I will consider the possibility of abstracting to the genus from all of the species below.)

Critically, the paradigm view is not a shared factor view. In the case of abstraction, we have the idea of analogies between mere and rational animals, and such analogies do not suggest that there is some factor which is the same in both cases. Given this, we might expect some version of this structure to do the trick. But, in fact, none can.

Recall that I initially suggested the paradigm/derivative view on the basis of an analogy between McDowell's treatment of error and his treatment of mere animals. We already saw one important dissimilarity between the two cases which forced us away from saying that mere animals are imperfect animals. But there's a deeper dissimilarity which does in any form of the paradigm view: namely, that knowledge is not *sui generis* with respect to mere belief. Mere belief and knowledge are both constituted by the same "normative relations that constitute the logical space of reasons": relations such as "one thing's being warranted, or – for the general case – correct, in the light of another" (*MW*, xv).¹⁰ In contrast, mere animal perception and rational animal perception are not both constituted by the same relations.

From the fact that they are constituted by different kinds of relations, it follows that we cannot understand one case as paradigmatic for the other. For that would mean that we "place" mere animals in their logical space through relating them to rational animals. This is what we do with abstracting and then forming analogies: the analogies assimilate the relations of the one case to those of the other, and they fail precisely where there are differences in those relations.

Consequently, this strategy requires us to understand mere animals in terms of the space of

¹⁰ And the same is true of non-veridical perception and perception: both belong in the space of reasons, simply because both engage our conceptual capacities, and so both can be thought of in terms of normative relations: what they fail to or actually do warrant.

reasons, at least to the extent that we can, and it would be precisely to that extent that we can understand their nature as animals. But we do not grasp things in the space of natural-science, like mere animals, by relating them to analogous things in the space of reasons. Precisely not: to do that would be to re-enchant nature and so to disrespect the progress made by the natural sciences.

All versions of the paradigm view understand the derivative case through situating it in relation to the paradigm case. And that would mean that we understand a bit of the biologically explicable world by appeal to spontaneity. Any such attempt runs afoul of McDowell's thought that there is a sharp distinction in kinds of intelligibility between the space of reasons and the space of natural science.

This also shows that we cannot understand the shared genus through abstracting from both species to what they have in common.¹¹ For this would make what it is to be an animal equivocal: with mere animals, we will have grasped their animality to the extent that we can place them in a biological taxonomy, or situate their animality in an evolutionary theory. That is what it would be for a mere animal to be an animal. But for rational animals, we will have grasped our animality to the extent that we place ourselves in the space of reasons. These two logics are different, and they force us to situate the genus differently, such that the idea of animality we arrive at by abstracting from mere animality is quite different from the one we arrive at by abstracting from rational animality.

¹¹ Kern subscribes to some version of the abstraction view – either the one just argued against, or the idea that we abstract from both species, and she views the concept of a sense-impression (for instance) which is not either determinately tied to the idea of a rational capacity for knowledge or to the idea of a non-rational capacity, as an abstraction: cf. Kern, *Quellen des Wissens*, 317-8.

Contrast this case with the more general description of genus/species relations from Aristotle.¹² In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle says that “by genus I mean that one identical thing which is predicated of both and is differentiated in no merely accidental way, whether conceived as matter or otherwise. For not only must the common nature attach to the different things, e.g. not only must both be animals, but this very animal must also be different for each (e.g. in the one case horse, in the other man), and therefore this common nature is specifically different.”¹³ Aristotle here describes the genus/species relation in a way which already eliminates the factorized conception of it: the genus itself must be different in the two species, for otherwise the species would lack the unity requisite to be a substance. Consequently, given everything McDowell says, Aristotle’s description should serve to dispel the worry about equivocation. But it does not.

Consider, first, a case in which it would dispel the worry about equivocation: a horse’s animality differs from a dog’s animality, without that difference making the genus equivocal. There are different stories we might give about why their animality differs. Perhaps it differs because they cannot reproduce with one another, or perhaps because the causal histories of the species are different, or perhaps because the judgments we make about their life-forms are indexed to different species. Maybe this last claim means that we cannot identify what counts as food or as a threat in a way which doesn’t already engage our recognition of which life form we are describing. All of these accounts purport to place the distinction between their animality within the logical space of biology. Hence, they all make the genus univocal: the specific differentiae are all of a kind with one another.

¹² I take this description to be particularly relevant because Aristotle’s description figures heavily in Boyle’s attempt to respond to the equivocation challenge: cf. Matthew Boyle, “Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique” in *European Journal of Philosophy* (Jan. 2016), 1-29, section 1.3.

¹³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X.8 1057b39-1058a7.

But this kind of story cannot be told in the present case.¹⁴ For our rationality places our animality in the space of reasons, while the animality of a horse preserves its place in biology. It would undermine the claim that rationality is *sui generis* in comparison to the nature of the natural scientists to claim that the generic idea of our animality is given to us by biology. For our animality is such that it not only provides us with reasons for saying and doing things – but it secures that we can recognize those reasons as such. Whatever specific differentia we need to add to the genus animal to arrive at this kind of animal, it will not be of the same kind as one which places a mere animal within biology.¹⁵

We need to make sense of our animality in a way which registers reason's role in it. It cannot be made sense of by appealing merely to the idea of the genus; it cannot be made sense of by appealing to rational animality as the paradigm species; it cannot be made sense of by trying to abstract from both species to a common genus. And, my present point, it cannot be made sense of by appeal to Aristotle's description of the genus/species relation.

Section 3

What about the claim that the source of our recognition of our shared animality is our grasp of mere animality? At this point, the claim might seem hopeless: either it would require some version of the factorizing view, or it would require some kind of paradigm view, and both threaten the sharp distinction in intelligibility between mere and rational animality. Before so

¹⁴ This runs contrary to the example that Aristotle himself gives when describing the genus/species structure; but it does not, I think, run counter to Aristotle's actual treatment of the subject in *de Anima*: Aristotle, I think, implicitly recognizes that there is something logically distinctive about this case, and his account is very similar to the one I propose in section 3.

¹⁵ Of course, we can also be studied by biology: presumably biology would have something to tell us about what kind of food we eat, for instance. But the conception of our animality which biology gives us cannot be the one relevant to the conception of animality that figures in McDowell's account of our rational animality. For the conception of our animality in which we are merely another biological species of animals is not one which can be used to place us in the space of reasons.

quickly dismissing this suggestion, however, it is worth noting an important respect in which mere animality differs from rational animality: the genus animal exhausts the species mere animal, such that there is nothing to being a mere animal over and above what there is to being an animal.¹⁶ This suggests that, whatever kind of animality we have, it needs to have its source in mere animality.

That there is nothing to being a mere animal over and above being an animal is suggested by our use of the term “mere” in the phrase “mere animal”: it is merely an animal, and nothing more. The bare idea of an animal brings with it the idea, let’s follow Aristotle in supposing, of a perceptive and desiderative soul. What do we add to this to arrive at a non-rational animal? Nothing – a non-rational animal is just the animal soul, when it is not in the presence of some further capacity (of reason). So, to say that a mere animal is non-rational is just to say that there is no further power in it beyond those that reflect its animality.

Let’s turn now to the suggestion that our grasp of mere animals is the source for our recognition of our shared animality. We need to resist the view that we arrive at a conception of rational animality through adding determinations or drawing analogies. If we take on board the idea that the genus animal exhausts the species mere animal, then there is a way to do this. For the lesson learned from the failure of the paradigm view is that we cannot grasp the genus

¹⁶ When Ford describes what he calls the “essential” genus/species relation, and what figures in my text as the idea of a perfect species, he notes that the essential species is the one in which there is nothing more to being it than being the genus: using the example of pure gold, he writes that “there is nothing extra that gold must be, over and above being gold, in order to be pure: the “purity” of pure gold is just its being gold – gold and gold alone” (Ford, 90). No version of what he characterizes as the essential genus/species relation will work, but it is nonetheless interesting that this description holds not of rational animals but of mere animals: there is nothing extra that a mere animal must be, over and above being an animal, in order to be a mere animal. That suggests that there is something right in the idea of taking mere animality to be the paradigm of animality, even if we have to cull that truth from the general structure of the paradigm/derivative view.

The point that we should work up to the idea of a rational animal beginning from the idea of a mere animal is also present in Aristotle (cf. *de Anima*, 415a1ff.) and Boyle (who draws on Aristotle: cf. Boyle, “Essentially Rational Animals,” 2.5), and to a certain extent even in McDowell – who acknowledges that the reflections of *Mind and World* presuppose the idea that animals can be perceptually sensitive to their environment: cf. McDowell, “Reply to Commentators,” in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* vol. 56, #2 (June, 1998), 403-431, 412.

through our grasp of either species. So, we cannot grasp the genus animal through the species mere animal. But there is nothing to mere animality beyond the genus. And so the fact that we cannot grasp the genus animal through the species mere animal reflects back on our ability to grasp that very species: we are in the predicament, it seems, of being unable to grasp the concept mere animal, though our starting point was that very concept. But this reveals the solution to our difficulty, another feature of the account we need in order to make sense of our shared animality: our grasp of the concept mere animal turns out to be in tension with itself. We cannot grasp what it is, we cannot make sense of it, without advancing to a concept of rational animality.

It might seem tempting to think that the failure of the paradigm view suggests that some form of the view that we must reflect on both of the species to arrive at the genus must be right. And, in a way, that's true: we can only grasp the genus animal – finally – through advancing from mere animality to rational animality, and so our grasp of the genus depends upon both species. But we need to avoid the worry that we cannot in fact form a common concept. We can see that what is required to avoid this objection is to think that we grasp what is common by progressing from one species to the other: the idea of needing to progress from one to the other secures the idea of something genuinely in common, while avoiding thinking of one species as derivative upon the other.

Of course, to make good on this account, one has to actually show that our grasp of mere animality is in tension with itself, a tension which forces us to progress to a concept of rational animality. It is noteworthy that Hegel takes himself to have found such a tension in the idea of

the relation between an animal and its kind.¹⁷ The next step in filling in this account ought, I think, to turn to what he has to say on the matter.

¹⁷ Cf. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans. and ed. George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 12.179-182, 12.189-191.