

## Andrew Werner

atwerner@uh.edu | [www.andrewwerner.org](http://www.andrewwerner.org) | [www.adventuresinthinking.com](http://www.adventuresinthinking.com)

### EDUCATION

**Ph.D. University of Chicago** | Chicago, IL | Department of Philosophy, August 2017  
Committee: Robert Pippin (chair); Jason Bridges; Paul Franks (Yale); Wolfram Gobsch (Leipzig)

**B.A. Amherst College** | Amherst, MA | Department of Philosophy (Honors), 2010

### AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Kant and German Idealism  
20<sup>th</sup> Century Continental Philosophy

### AREAS OF COMPETENCE

19<sup>th</sup> Century Philosophy  
Ancient Philosophy  
Ethics  
Philosophy of Gender

### EMPLOYMENT

2022-present Lecturer at University of Houston, Philosophy Department and Honors College  
2021-2022 Adjunct Lecturer in Philosophy, Houston Community College  
2019-2021 Lecturer in the Humanities, Yale University  
2018-2019 Visiting Lecturer in Philosophy, Amherst College  
2017-2018 Lecturer in Philosophy and the Humanities, Yale University

### PUBLICATIONS

2024 "From Interacting Substances to Recognizing Persons: On the Logical Foundations of Hegel's Theory of Recognition" in *The Philosophy of Recognition: Expanded Perspectives on a Fundamental Concept*, edited by Matt Congdon and Thomas Khurana. Routledge Press, forthcoming

2023 "Cognizing Coexistence: Perceptions and their Synthetic Unity in Kant's 3rd Analogy" in *Journal of Modern Philosophy*, 5.6 (peer reviewed)

2023 "A Hegelian Response to Disjunctivism" in *Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Analytic Philosophy*, edited by James Conant and Jonas Held, forthcoming

2020 "Hegel's Dialectical Method: A Response to the Modification View," in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 50.6: 767-784 (peer reviewed)

2019 "Some Limits to Hegel's Appeal to Life," in *Argumenta* 4.2: 143-157 (peer reviewed)

2018 "Hegel on Kant's Analytic/Synthetic Distinction," in the *European Journal of Philosophy*, 26.1: 502-524 (peer reviewed)

### REVIEWS

2019 *Kant and His German Contemporaries*, edited by Corey W. Dyck, Falk Wunderlich, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 57.1: 173-4

### RESEARCH LANGUAGES

German  
French

## **PRESENTATIONS**

### **Peer-Reviewed**

- 2022 “Avoiding Impositionism By Making No Presuppositions,” Hegel en Perspectiva, Valencia, Spain, June 6-8
- 2022 “Hegel’s Second Analogy,” Examining the Sources of Hegel’s *Logic*,” Warwick, UK, June 2-4
- 2021 “The Synthesis of Perceptions in Kant’s 3<sup>rd</sup> Analogy,” Pacific North American Kant Society Conference, Online, February 20
- 2018 “The Forms of Intuition in the Transcendental Deduction,” Eastern North American Kant Society Conference, Columbia University, May 4-5
- 2017 “The Organic and the Logical: What Goes Wrong with Organic Models of Hegel’s Logical Method,” German Classical Philosophy and Naturalism, Georgetown University, December 14-6
- 2017 “Kant, Hegel, and the Unity of the Intellect,” SGIR-NAKS Joint Conference on Kantian Legacies in German Idealism and Romanticism, Stanford University, October 14-15
- 2017 “Hegel on Divine Cognition,” Models of Divine and Human Intellect in Kant and Hegel, Universität Tübingen, February 16-18
- 2015 “Is Logical Content *a priori* for Hegel?” Conference on Contemporary Debates in German Idealism, Xavier University, April 17-19

### **Invited**

- 2024 “Hegel’s Externalist Epistemology of Empirical Knowledge,” at the Ethics and Normativity Series Seminar, University of Houston, December 1.
- 2023 “Cognizing Coexistence: Perceptions and their Synthetic Unity in Kant’s 3<sup>rd</sup> Analogy,” Virtual North American Kant Society Ideal Critics series.
- 2021 Comments on R. Brian Tracz’s “Kant on Imagination and the Influence of the Understanding,” APA Eastern Division Meeting, online, January 7-9 and 14-6
- 2019 “Reconsidering Hegel’s Complex Response to Skepticism,” Yale University, January 28
- 2015 “On the Very Idea of an Account of a Self-Conscious Capacity,” Conference in Honor of Stephen Engstrom, Universität Leipzig, July 15-18
- 2015 “The Method of Hegel’s *Logic*: Modification, Spontaneity, Unity,” Universität Leipzig, July 14
- 2014 “Hegel’s Idea: The Regressive and Progressive Method of the Logic,” Conference on Absolute Idealism, Universität Leipzig, July 16-18
- 2010 “Different Distances: Diamond and McDowell,” Conference in Honor of Cora Diamond, University of Amiens, September 13-15

## **AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS**

- 2017 SGIR Graduate Paper of the Year, Society for German Idealism and Romanticism
- 2015 Ames Departmental Dissertation Completion Fellowship, University of Chicago Philosophy Department (for 2015-2016)
- 2010 *Phi Beta Kappa* Society, Amherst College Chapter

2009 The Beinecke Scholarship for pursuing post-graduate studies in the humanities and social sciences (held from 2010-2015)

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

**Lecturer**, served as instructor of record; held regular office hours; graded all assignments and exams

University of Houston

Fall 2023 Ancient Philosophy; 19<sup>th</sup> Century Philosophy; Human Situation

Spring 2023 Ancient Philosophy; 19<sup>th</sup> Century Philosophy

Fall 2022 Ancient Philosophy; 19<sup>th</sup> Century Philosophy

Yale University

Spring 2020 Directed Studies (from Descartes to Murdoch)

Fall 2019 Directed Studies (from Plato to Aquinas)

Amherst College

Spring 2019 Early Modern Philosophy

Fall 2018 Philosophical Questions (introduction to philosophy)

Yale University

Spring 2018 Directed Studies (from Descartes to Murdoch)

Fall 2017 Time and French Philosophy

Fall 2017 Directed Studies (from Plato to Aquinas)

The School of the Art Institute of Chicago

Fall 2016 First Year Seminar: Introduction to Ethics

University of Chicago

Spring 2015 Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*

For a list of my non-profit teaching, please see “**SERVICE**” below.

## SERVICE

Editorial Director of the Society of German Idealism and Romanticism, 2021-present

Founder, Instructor for the non-profit *Adventures in Thinking* (2021-present), Houston and virtual; see [www.adventuresinthinking.com](http://www.adventuresinthinking.com).

NOTE: I started the non-profit *Adventures in Thinking* with the mission of making philosophy available to high school students, especially those from under-resourced communities. We offer a number of services to high school students and high school teachers. So far, the work has consisted primarily in two things. First, organizing and leading once a week philosophy clubs over Zoom with interested high school students. In this capacity, I have taught on the philosophy of courage, emotion, art, de Beauvoir, and Nietzsche. (Others in the organization are hosting other clubs which I have organized.) Second, I have taught political philosophy in high school classrooms in the Houston area. I have done units on Marx, Derrida, Mouffe, and Butler.

Board Member, Instructor, Curriculum Designer for the Texas Debate Collective Summer Institute (2009-present), *Austin*; see [www.texasdebatecollective.org](http://www.texasdebatecollective.org).

NOTE: In my capacities as instructor, each summer I would teach between 10-15 high school students for over 100 hours of instructional time over the course of two weeks. For

most students, I would explain some basic moral and political philosophy (typically using excerpts from texts by thinkers like Korsgaard and Petit) – our focus would be on understanding different theories of the sources of value; for more advanced students, we would work on philosophical texts and topics that most interested them (e.g., Judith Butler, Stephen Engstrom, David Enoch). All students would write and receive extensive feedback on drafts and final versions of two four page papers and two seven page papers. More recently, my primary role has been teaching groups of high school teachers (debate coaches) how to teach basic and more advanced moral and political philosophy to their students.

Referee, *Idealistic Studies* (2019)

Referee, *Hegel Bulletin* (2017, 2019)

Referee, *European Journal of Philosophy* (2017, 2020)

## REFERENCES

### **James Kreines**

Edward S. Gould Professor of Philosophy at Claremont McKenna College

909-607-6845

[james.kreines@claremontmckenna.edu](mailto:james.kreines@claremontmckenna.edu)

### **Thomas Khurana**

Chair of Philosophical Anthropology and Philosophy of Mind at Potsdam University

+49 331-977-113136

[khurana@uni-potsdam.de](mailto:khurana@uni-potsdam.de)

### **Brady Bowman**

Associate Profess of Philosophy at Penn State University

813-863-0657

[blb42@psu.edu](mailto:blb42@psu.edu)

### **David Phillips** (teaching reference)

Chair of Philosophy at the University of Houston Main Campus

713-743-3010

[dphillips@uh.edu](mailto:dphillips@uh.edu)

Book Project: *The Method of Hegel's Logic and the Validity of Causality*

Presently I am at work on a book which explains and motivates Hegel's conception of philosophical method, his (in)famous dialectical method. In the first part of the book I explain the method generally. In the second part, I focus on his account of causality as a test case for my new interpretation.

*Part I* Drawing on Robert Pippin's pioneering work, I argue that Hegel's method is intended to respond to a skeptical worry that was particularly salient to those working in the wake of Kant. As Pippin shows, Kant, and those who follow him, are very concerned with a generalized version of Hume's worry about causality: according to Hume, I bring the category of causality to my experiences, as one of their organizing principles; but I do so without any right, such that the category of causality is a subjective imposition I make in order to organize the world according to my mental habits, and (for all I know) does not reflect the way the world actually is. Generalized, the skeptical worry is that all of the fundamental features of our mindedness are imposed by us on the world and do not sustain our capacity to know or act in the world.

Pippin's way of explaining the worry in connection with Hegel's work draws heavily on Kant, and he largely takes for granted that the worry is one we should have. Rather than focusing on the historical details of Hegel's relationship with Kant, I explain the source of the worry by focusing on the epistemology of theoretical and practical cognition, arguing that the worry inescapably arises for, and cannot be answered by, those forms of cognition: forms of cognition that aspire to know objects that are existentially independent of being known. Drawing on both his early and late works, I show that Hegel had just this understanding of the worry: this comes out in his discussion of "the opposition of thinking and being," the relation between the understanding and reason, and in his account of "finite cognition." I also argue that the worry, understood in Hegel's way, undermines many of the most interesting attempts within contemporary epistemology to answer it, focusing in particular on attempts to respond to it put forth by Barry Stroud, Thomas Nagel, John McDowell and Andrea Kern.

After articulating the worry in chapter 1, I give an account of Hegel's method as his proposed solution to the worry. My argument on this score has two steps: first, in chapter 2, I show that Hegel's method involves a form of cognition the object of which is inseparable from the cognition of it, or such that the object is not existentially independent of our knowledge of it. I show that this is incompatible with the accounts of Hegel's method put forward by many of the most prominent Hegel scholars, focusing especially on Dieter Henrich, Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Michael Theunissen. To help explain what this form of cognition can mean, I discuss Descartes's cogito (about which, contrary to what many think, Hegel speaks approvingly) and also recent work on first person thought by Sebastian Rödl. I explain the respects in which these topics can serve as models for the dialectical method and the respects in which they cannot.

Second, in chapter 3, I show that Hegel's method involves a very special form of conceptual analysis: since the object of our cognition and our cognition of it are inseparable (and yet not simply identical), Hegel thinks that an analysis of the concepts we articulate through this form of cognition is just as such a synthesis or a combination of our cognition with its object, and so the analysis can yield new content. I consider and respond to a criticism of Hegel raised most thoroughly by Jacques Derrida, according to which the dialectical method must remain without any determinate content (the "general economy" can never do without, but can also never be used to arrive at, the "restricted economy," as Derrida puts it in his earlier work), by showing that the progression, in its synthetic aspect, does yield determinate content. Because the object that we think dialectically is inseparable from our cognition of it, there is no logical space to worry that the forms of our cognition (the content we arrive at) are imposed upon the world. And if, as Hegel thinks, we can arrive at the

forms of our theoretical and practical cognition through employing this method, then we can also secure them from the worry about impositionism.

*Part II* Such is the general account I put forth in Part I of the book. But to be persuasive, and to really see whether it is how Hegel in fact proceeds, it is important to examine some examples of how the method works to secure the objective validity of forms of our mindedness. In Part II, I focus on Hegel's account of substance, causality, and interaction (or reciprocal causality). Surprisingly, almost no one has noticed that in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel gives his own version of Kant's Analogies. Kant's account of the Analogies has received extensive attention in the secondary literature and in contemporary attempts to defend the category of causality from Hume's challenge. But almost no one has written on Hegel's treatment of this very same topic, even while most scholars agree that Hegel is worried about exactly the same issue.

In the book, I will rectify this situation. I will use the general account of the method that I articulate in Part I as the guide for interpreting Hegel's account of these categories, each of which will be the topic of a chapter of the book. Hegel begins his account with the concept of a thing (an accident) that can cease to be or come into being. Arguably, this is a concept that Hume (and most Humeans) would accept as objectively valid. Hegel then argues that we can only make sense of this concept if the coming into being of an accident is the ceasing to be of another, and the ceasing to be of an accident is the coming into being of another. That connection of accidents, he then shows, requires the notion of a substance as what underlies. From there he argues that a substance can only be the underlying unity of a manifold of accidents if it is causally efficacious, or able to produce the coming into being of one accident (in another substance). Developing that notion by employing the Aristotelian ideas of active and passive substances, he then argues that the notion of an interaction of substances only makes sense if there is a form of reciprocal causality in which a causally efficacious determination of one substance is inseparably cause and effect of a causally efficacious determination of another substance. I argue that his response to Hume is plausible, even if it may not convince committed Humeans, and that his account offers a rich development of different aspects of the notion of causality.

Hegel's account of causality is not only his attempt to rewrite Kant's Analogies – it is also his explanation of the transition from the logic of necessity to the logic of freedom. I show that Hegel's account of reciprocal causality involves the idea of a manifold of substances mutually determining one another, such that the nature of a substance refers to each other substance with which it interacts, the natures of which in turn refer to it. He shows that such a system – exemplified, for instance, in gravity – is one of “free realities” and thus depends for its intelligibility on the development of “the realm of subjectivity or freedom” (11.409). My account of causality will thus shed light on the difficult question of how Hegel thinks about the relation between necessity and freedom.